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Abstract - This paper shows the behavior of a storage technique for anonymous 
data, based on parallel channels implementation. At the beginning, it was 
conceived to apply on electronic vote. However, it may be generalized to 
whatever situation that requires anonymity and demands very high level of 
security respect from loss of information. Furthermore, a formula mistake that 
was slipped in previous publications has been corrected here. Finally, results of 
simulations are shown, to analyze the behavior of the equations proposed.
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1. Introduction
There are many real-world problems that require very high levels of security with 
respect to information use. A good example of an application, whose level of demand 
in that sense is highest, is the electronic voting. In such an application, the condition 
of anonymity of a voter indefinitely is crucial. But indisputably it must be ensured 
that the result of the ballot accurately reflects the will of the electorate.
It is obvious that the interests involved are very transcendent and that, therefore, 
attempts to perform a fraud may occur with high probability. And if consider in detail, 
many aspects of the process, whose safety must be ensured, appear. In this case, the 
behavior of an alternative proposal for the storage of votes, based in the 
implementation of parallel channels of slots will be analyzed.
The results shown in this paper belong to a research line that began in 2013 [1]. 
Within this scope, it is searched to define the exact assurance level requested for 
anonymity in an electronic voting scheme. In [2] it is concluded that it is necessary to 
give unconditional security for the privacy, because it must be protected indefinitely. 
Otherwise, votes must be kept for a finite period of time.
Consequently, protocols that verify that condition reach most importance. 
Particularly one of the most interesting is Dinning Cryptographers, which is described 
in detail in [3]. This protocol is resourceful and it covers the requirement to guarantee 
unconditional privacy.
The model may be described as follows:
“Three cryp tographers  share  a d inner in a  restaurant. W hen the tim e to  p a y  
com es, the w a ite r  te lls  them  th a t the add ition  h a s  a lready been  p a id  a n d  th a t w ho  d id
i t ,  d o e s  n o t  w a n t  t h a t  h i s  i d e n t i t y  i s  r e v e a l e d .  C r y p t o g r a p h e r s  w a n t  t o  k n o w  i f  a n y  o f  
t h e  g u e s t s  w a s  t h e  o n e  w h o  m a d e  t h e  p a y m e n t ,  o r  i f  i t  w a s  p a i d  b y  s o m e o n e  e x t e r n a l  
t o  t h e  g r o u p  o f  d i n e r s .  T h e y  o n l y  w a n t  t o  k n o w  w h e t h e r  a n y  o f  t h e m  p a i d  o r  n o t .  ”
R a is e d  in  th is  w a y , th e  s o lu t io n  fo u n d  is :
“E a c h  o f  t h e  d i n e r s  t h r o w s  a  c o in .  H e  l o o k s  a t  t h e  r e s u l t  a n d  s h a r e s  w i t h  i t s  
n e i g h b o r  o n  t h e  l e f t .  T h e n ,  e a c h  o f  t h e m  l o o k s  e x a c t l y  t w o  c u r r e n c i e s ,  s e l f  a n d  
n e i g h b o r  w h o  s h a r e s  w i t h  h im .  F i n a l l y ,  e a c h  o n e  s h o u l d  i n d i c a t e  w h e t h e r  t h e  t w o  
c u r r e n c i e s  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  o b s e r v e d  a r e  ”e q u a l ” o r  ” d i f f e r e n t ” w i t h  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  
i f  a n y  o f  t h e m  p a i d  t h e  a d d i t i o n ,  h e  s h o u l d  l i e  a b o u t  h i s  s t a t e m e n t .  ”
In  the c o n d it io n s  d e s c r ib e d , i f  the n u m b e r  o f  c ry p to g r a p h e r s  p r o c la im in g  
“ d if fe r e n t”  is  o d d , the p a y e r  is  in  th e  g r o u p  o f  d in ers . A n  e v e n  n u m b er , o th e r w ise , 
in d ica te s  that the p a y e r  is  e x te rn a l t o  the g ro u p .
D in in g  c ry p to g r a p h e r s  p resen ts  u n c o n d it io n a l s e cu r ity  le v e ls , w ith  reg a rd  to  
a n o n y m ity  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  the is su a n c e  o f  c e r ta in  in fo rm a t io n , th ro u g h  p u b lic  
ch a n n e ls . T h e  in itia l p r o b le m  is  b a s e d  o n  th ree  p a rtic ip a n ts  e x c h a n g in g  o n ly  o n e  b i t  o f  
in fo rm a t io n , b u t  it  g e n e r a liz e s  t o  an y  n u m b e r  o f  p a rtic ip a n ts  a n d  a n y  v o lu m e  o f  
in fo r m a t io n  n a tu ra lly  a n d  w ith o u t  s ig n if ica n t  c o m p lic a t io n s .
It is  n e c e s s a ry  t o  h ig h lig h t  s o m e  p o in ts :
1 ) It is  c o n s id e r e d  that the c u r r e n c ie s  u s e d  p r o v id e  a  tru ly  r a n d o m  e x p e r im e n t  
resu lt  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  “ th r o w  th e  c o in ” , s o  that, P r  ( “H e a d s ” )  =  P r  (  “ T a i l s  ” )  =  / .
2 )  T h is  s c h e m e  g iv e s  c o r r e c t  resu lts  o n ly  i f  it has th e  h o n e s ty  in  the r e s p o n s e  o f  a ll 
p a rtic ip a n ts . I f  s o m e o n e  p a id  b u t h e  d o e s  n o t  lie  in  h is  sta tem en t the m o d e l  d o e s  n o t  
gu a ra n tee  r igh t c o n c lu s io n s . T h e  sa m e  a p p lie s  i f  a d in er , w h o  d id  n o t  p a y  th e  b i l l ,  
d o e s  n o t  te ll  the tru th  w h e n  c o m p a r in g  b o t h  cu rre n c ie s .
3 )  T h is  s c h e m e  w o r k s  c o r r e c t ly  i f  a  s in g le  p a y m e n t  is  m a d e  f o r  d in n er . I f  
the w a ite r  h a d  a c c e p t e d  t w o  o r  m o r e  a n o n y m o u s  p a y m e n ts , the c o n c lu s io n s  w i l l  n o t  
b e  c o rr e c t . T h is  p o in t  re la tes  t o  the a b o v e : the o r ig in a l m o d e l  w o r k s  p r o p e r ly  o n ly  i f  
a ll p a rtic ip a n ts  s h o w  a n  h o n e s t  b e h a v io r .
4 )  I f  the re q u ir e d  c o n d it io n s  are  r igh t, n o n e  o f  the d in ers  g e t  a n y  in fo r m a t io n  o n  the 
id en tity  o f  th e  p a y e r . A s  stated , i f  the p a y e r  is  ex tern a l, a n o n y m ity  is  assu red . I f  the 
p a y e r  b e lo n g s  to  the g r o u p , it is  e a sy  to  a n a ly z e  c a s e s  to  c o n c lu d e  that a  c ry p to g r a p h e r  
w h o  d id  n o t  p a y  the b i l l  d o e s  n o t  r e c e iv e  an y  in fo r m a t io n  that a l lo w s  d e d u c in g  the 
id en tity  o f  the p a y er . T h is  p ro p e r ty  m a k e s  it  v e r y  a ttractive  s c h e m e , s in ce  the cen tra l 
g o a l  (a n o n y m ity )  is  o b ta in e d  b y  d e fa u lt, as in c lu d e d  in  the s c h e m e  w ith o u t  a d d it io n a l 
e ffo r t .
5 )  O n e  e le m e n t  o f  g rea t  v a lu e  in  D in in g  C ry p to g ra p h e rs  is  the u n c o n d it io n a l 
s e cu r ity  g iv e n  to  the a n o n y m ity . A  sy s te m  w h ic h  a l lo w s  t ra n sm iss io n  o f  m e s s a g e s  
en s u r in g  the u n c o n d it io n a l a n o n y m ity  o f  the so u rc e  is  p r o v id e d . F o r  an y  in fo r m a t io n  
e x c h a n g e  s c h e m e  in  w h ic h  p r iv a c y  is  d e s ire d , d in in g  c ry p to g r a p h e r s  b e c o m e s  a v e r y  
a ttractive  sc h e m e .
T o  u n d erstan d  the u n d e r ly in g  r e a s o n  w h y  a n o n y m ity  is  e n su red , it is  n e c e s s a ry  to  
p u t in  p la c e  a d in e r  w h o  has n o t  p a id  the b i l l  ( C ). O b v io u s ly ,  the c a s e  in  w h ic h  the 
p a y e r  is  ex te rn a l g u a ra n tees  a n o n y m ity  b a s e d  o n  th e  a ss u m p tio n s  o f  th e  sc h e m e . 
T h e r e fo r e , o n e  m u st a n a ly z e  the c a s e  w h e re  the p a y e r  b e lo n g s  to  the g r o u p  o f  
c ry p to g ra p h e rs . T h is  c a n  o n ly  h a v e  t w o  a ltern ativ es :
• T h e  t w o  c u r r e n c i e s  t h a t  C  l o o k s  a r e  e q u a l .  In  t h is  c a s e ,  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  
o n e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t i c ip a n t s  in d i c a t e d  “ e q u a l ”  a n d  th e  o t h e r  “ d i f f e r e n t ” .
Therefore, if the currency that he could not observe were equal to 
the one he saw, the participant who said ’’different” is the payer. And, 
conversely, if the unknown currency was different from which he could 
see, the payer is who expressed “equal”. However, both states are 
equally probable in the scheme. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain 
information related to the payer.
• T h e  tw o  c u r r e n c i e s  t h a t  C  lo o k s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t . In this case, it is 
inevitable that the other two cryptographers express coincident results. 
If both say “different”, the payer will be the participant who is closest to 
the currency matching the result of the hidden coin. And if both 
proclaim “equal”, the payer is who is closer to the currency that differs 
from the value of the hidden coin. As in the previous case both 
situations are equally probable. Consequently, any information that 
betrays the identity of the payer may not be obtained.
To complete the analysis, the concept of view, which will allow us to 
demonstrate the safety of the proposed scheme, is defined:
A view is a random variable describing what set of information has a 
particular participant when the process is finished. For example, at the end of 
the election act if  it is a scheme of electronic voting.
If we may prove that the view obtained by any user may not determine the 
choices made by the other participants in any case, anonymity is ensured. In 
particular, to analyze the scheme Dining Cryptographers, we may distinguish 
the following elements and analyze which ones are visible for each 
participant:
• Coins: according to the mechanics of the DC model, each participant 
sees its own currency and its neighbor’s on the left. We denominate x i 
e  { T a i ls ,  H e a d s }  to the value obtained in the action of the coin toss i.
• Investment information: The value of this element will be m t e  { T r u e ,  
F a l s e } .  If m , is True, it implies that the participant paid the bill and, 
therefore, lies about the obtained result when comparing the two 
currencies that can be observed. A value False implies the opposite.
• Information comparing two currencies: For this data r  e  { E q u a l ,  
D i f f e r e n t }  will be used. Obviously, a value Equal implies that the 
participant i declares that the values of the two currencies which he may 
see are coincident.
Therefore, in these terms, initial security scheme may be observed. It is 
sufficient to analyze the views that a particular participant has for all possible 
cases, since the symmetry of the scheme ensures that the conclusions may be 
generalized for all participants.
The views that the participant A i could have available is then analyzed. 
The cases are:
• The payer is external. In this case, anonymity is guaranteed.
• A 1  is the payer. This situation is also trivial.
• A 2  is the payer. The view that A1 has available is the following:
V i  = (x i ,  - ,  x 3, m i,  - ,  - ,  r i ,  r 2 , r 3)  (1)
A 3 is the payer. In this situation, A j  observes:
V i = (x i ,  - ,  x 3, m ¡, - ,  - ,  r i ,  r 2, r 3) (2)
It is clear that the views of the last two cases are coincident. Specifically, 
the values of xi , x 3, m i and r i have the same probability distribution in both 
cases; r 2 and r 3, instead, present opposing values depending on who paid the 
bill. However, that does not give additional information to Ai, because such 
values depend on x 2 , value he does not know and has the same probability to 
take either of two possible values.
Therefore, if  any of his colleagues paid dinner, A1 cannot tell who it was, 
because:
2. Non - Interactive Dining Cryptographers (NIDC)
The analysis is focused on a derivative one called Non Interactive Dining 
Cryptographers (NIDC, [4]), that relaxes the condition of concurrency online 
for all participants, condition that is present in multiple real-world problems.
The idea is that, through the use of blind signatures introduced by Chaum
[5], the voter obtains a valid vote of the authorities of the process election. In 
particular, the protocol presented in [6] could be used. This protocol allows 
the voter communicate with authorities to send a blind vote. They respond by 
signing (blindly) the vote and resending it to the voter. It should be noted that 
the process is perfect and that all options are mathematically equal, the reason 
explaining why authorities cannot deduct any information related to the 
voter’s option.
Obviously, the authorities should record each vote, so that no voter may 
cast vote several times. Similarly, both parties must sign their messages and 
keep records of them for the purpose of solving any subsequent dispute.
Upon receiving the message from the authorities, the voter retrieves it and 
he can verify that it contains a valid and signed vote.
NIDC uses a storage model based on a single vector of slots. The 
anonymity is guaranteed by random position where a vote is stored. The fact 
of randomness brings the outcome of collisions. A collision occurs when two 
or more votes are stored in the same slot. That results in the loss of the 
coincident votes. In this context, the proposed model in Figure 1 may be 
explained by Birthday Paradox [7] which states:
“I n  a  g r o u p  o f  2 3  p e o p l e ,  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  th e r e  a r e  a t  l e a s t  2  w h o  s h a r e  
th e  s a m e  b i r t h d a y  i s  v e r y  c l o s e  to  V2 . ”
This assertion is little auspicious for the purposes of this research. 
Associated vector size is relatively large respect to the sample; however, the 
associated security level is far from what could be acceptable in practical 
applications. An E-voting system in which the probability of loosing at least 
one vote is next to /  lacks importance.
Pr ( A i )  = Pr ( A 2) = U (3)
Graphically, the original scheme is shown in Figure 1.
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Fig1:  Or iginal  Storage Sc heme  N I D C
The tendency of behavior of a scheme like Birthday paradox keeps little 
interesting values whatever the parameters were. The amount of positions that 
must maintain the vector to obtain acceptable security levels is very 
significant. For example in the typical case (365 days and 23 people) the 
probability of a collision approaches /  although, there exists 342 dates where 
nobody was born.
It is possible to think about a scheme that improves this redundancy in an 
efficient way. This alternative is described in the next section.
3. NEW PROPOSED STORAGE SCHEME TO NIDC
According to what is stated in the previous section, it becomes of great interest 
to analyze deeply the possibility to find alternative methods that improve the 
use of storage, since the single vector scheme requires significant number of 
positions in order to ensure an appropriate security level. In [8] an alternative 
proposal is exposed. It is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig 2: New Alternative For Storage.
In [9] another approach is shown, related to NIDC. It is based on parallel or 
serial channels. Conversely, this document goes forward to what was exposed 
in [10], where a series of equations are exposed. Those equations describe 
behavior of the model, based on the following parameters:
T: #total slots to implement.
S: #slots on each channel.
Q: #parallel channels to implement.
Qt: #parallel channels to implement. (Theoretical).
Q p : #parallel channels to implement. (Practical).
N :  # voters.
Vi: i_ th  vote.
R i/. event which indicates that V t occupies j _ t h  slot.
Cjk: event that occurs when Vi collides with Vj in channel k.
B ij. event when Vj loses in cannel j .
A {. event which indicates that at least a multiple collision is produced.
X: event which indicates that no vote is lost simultaneously in all channels. 
L: #votes that are lost in all channels simultaneously.
I :  e v e n t  w h i c h  in d i c a t e s  t h a t  a t  le a s t  a  m u l t ip l e  c o l l i s i o n  is  p r o d u c e d .
T h e  e q u a t i o n s  e x p o s e d  in  [1 0 ]  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
F o r  a  f i x e d  n u m b e r  o f  v o t e r s  N , th e  r e c o m m e n d e d  n u m b e r  o f  s l o t s  ( S )  f o r  
e a c h  p a r a l l e l  c h a n n e l  i s  g i v e n  b y  th e  f o r m u la :
5  = I N
I ln 2
+ 1 ( 4 )
F o r  g i v e n  v a lu e s  o f  T  a n d  N ,  t h e r e  e x i s t  a n  o p t im a l  n u m b e r  o f  p a r a l le l  
c h a n n e ls .  S u c h  v a lu e  is  e x p r e s s e d  b y :
Q  t =  l n  2 T-  ( 5 )
T h a t  f o r m u l a  s h o u ld  b e  t h e  n e x t  in t e g e r .
Q p  =| Q t  I + 1  ( 6 )
A s  e x p la in e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  it  is  r o u n d e d  t o  t h e  n e x t  in t e g e r ,  s in c e  t h e  v a lu e  o f  
Q  a p p l ie d  m u s t  b e  n e c e s s a r i l y  in t e g e r .
T h e  e x p e c t e d  v a lu e  f o r  t h e  P L V  v a r ia b l e  (P e r c e n t a g e  o f  L o s t  V o t e s )  is  
o b t a in e d  b y  a p p l y i n g  e q u a t io n :
I PLV I =  (1 ( 7 )
A n  a p p r o p r ia t e  l o w e r  b o u n d  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  “ n o  v o t e s  a re  l o s t ”  is  
o b t a in e d  b y  c o m p u t i n g  e q u a t io n :
P  r  ( X )  >  1 — ( j  ( N  — 1 )  Q )  N  ( 8 )
T h is  la s t  e q u a t i o n  c o r r e c t s  th e  o n e  p u b l i s h e d  in  [8 ]  w h e r e  a n  e r r o r  w a s  
s l ip p e d .  I n d e e d ,  t h e  f o r m u l a  is  c o r r e c t l y  d e v e l o p e d ,  a s  f o l l o w s :
F o r  Q  =  1:
I f  V 1  d r o p s  in  s l o t  1, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  c o l l i d e  w i t h  V 2, c o n s i s t s  o n  th a t  b o t h  
d r o p  in  s l o t  1:
P  r  (  C , 2 ,  | R ,  i ) = j j  =  £  ( 9 )
T h e n ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  th a t  v o t e s  V i  a n d  V 2 c o l l i d e  in  w h a t e v e r  s l o t  is :
P  r  (  C ,  2 ,  ) = ^ S = j  ( 1 0 )
P  r  (  C ,  2 , )  =  P  r  (  C 17 0  V y e  {  3  . .  N  }  ( 1 1 )
L e t  I  =  “ M u l t ip l e  C o l l i s i o n s  o c c u r ” , w h e r e ,  “ M u l t i p l e  C o l l i s i o n ”  m e a n s  th a t  
t h r e e  o r  m o r e  v o t e s  a r e  s t o r e d  in  th e  s a m e  s lo t .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
th a t  V i  is  l o s t  in  t h e  o n l y  c h a n n e l  is  g i v e n  b y  t h e  e x p r e s s io n :
P  r  (L ?i 1 )  =  1  ( N  — 1 ) - P  r  ( / )  ( 1 2 )
F r o m  th e  p r e v i o u s  e q u a t i o n ,  a n o t h e r  o n e ,  w h i c h  is  m o r e  a p p r o p r ia te  is 
d e r iv e d . T h is  e q u a t io n  is  b a s e d  o n  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  V i  is  n o t  lo s t .
P r  ( B  )  =  1 — - ( N  — 1 )  +  P r  ( /  )  ( 1 3 )
T h e  v a lu e  f o r  P r ( I )  i s  l o w  b u t  p o s i t i v e ,  th e n :
P r  ( B  ) > 1 — - ( N  — 1 )  ( 1 4 )
T h e  p r e v i o u s  f o r m u l a  le t s  e x p l a i n  t o  a  v o t e r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  th a t  h is  v o t e  is  
l o s t  o r  n o t  in  a  s in g l e  c h a n n e l  s c h e m e .  T h e  a c c u r a c y  o f  th e  f o r m u l a  in c r e a s e s  
w h e n  .
W h e n  m o r e  c h a n n e ls  a r e  a d d e d ,  it  c a n  b e  a s s e r t e d :
P r  ( A  £)  =  P r  ( B £ )  Q >  ( -  ( N  — 1 )  )  °  V  i e  {  1  . . . N  }  ( i 5 )
F in a l ly ,  a n  a p p r o p r ia t e  l o w e r  b o u n d  f o r  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  X = ”n o  v o t e  i s  
l o s t  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  i n  a l l  c h a n n e l s ” , i s  o b t a in e d  a p p ly in g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
e q u a t io n :
P r  ( X )  =  P r  (B B )  n  P r  ( B )  n  ... n  P r  ( B  N )  ( i 6 )
B u t :
P  r  ( B - )  =  P  r  (B B )  =  • • • P  r  ( B ^ )  ( i  7 )
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e y  a re  s e l f  in d e p e n d e n t  e v e n t s ,  th e n :
P r  ( X )  =  P r  ( B - )  N  ( i 8 )
O r  w h a t  i s  t h e  s a m e :
P r  ( X )  =  1  — P r  ( B  )  N  ( 1 9 )
F in a l ly ,  i t  c a n  b e  a s s e r t e d :
P r  ( X )  >  1  — (  ( - ( N  — 1 )  )  « )  N  ( 2 0 )
P r e c i s e l y ,  a t t h is  p o in t ,  t h e  f o r m u l a  p u b l i s h e d  in  [8 ]  h a s  a n  e r r o r ,  c o n s i s t i n g  
o n  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  a  p a r e n t h e s is .  T h e  f o r m u l a  d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  ( 2 0 )  is  th e  
c o r r e c t  f o r m .
T h is  l o w e r  b o u n d  is  v e r y  u s e f u l  t o  d e s c r i b e  th e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  l o s i n g  v o t e s  
in  a  r e a l  v o t i n g  w i t h  m e n t i o n e d  p a r a m e t e r s .  D e f i n i t e l y ,  i t  a l l o w s  k n o w i n g  
p r e v i o u s l y  t h e  e x a c t  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  n o  l o s i n g  v o t e s  d u r in g  t h e  p r o c e s s .
4. SIMULATIONS
G i v e n  f o r m u la s  a b o v e  a n d  k n o w i n g  a b o u t  e r r o r  in  f o r m u l a  ( [ 8 ] ) ,  a  s im u la t o r  
h a s  b e e n  i m p le m e n t e d  w h i c h  h a v e  t w o  m a in  a im s :
1 ) T o  v e r i f y  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  f o r m u la s .
2 )  T o  b e a r  o u t  th a t  t h e  a p p r o a c h  o f  s t o r in g  in  p a r a l l e l  c h a n n e ls  o p t i m i z e s  
t h e  r e s u l t s  in  t e r m s  o f  s e v e r a l  v a r ia b l e s  w h i c h  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .
T h e  s im u la t o r  is  im p l e m e n t e d  a l l o w i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  in p u t s :
1 ) T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  s l o t s  t o  i m p l e m e n t  ( T ) .
2 )  N u m b e r  o f  v o t e r s  ( N ) .
3 )  Q u a n t i t y  o f  p a r a l l e l  c h a n n e ls  t o  i m p l e m e n t  ( Q ) .
4 )  Q u a n t i t y  o f  e l e c t i o n  a c t s  th a t  w i l l  b e  s im u la t e d  b y  s e s s i o n  (R ) .
T h e  s im u la t o r  v e r i f i e s  th a t  t h e  t o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  s l o t s  ( T )  i s  a  m u l t ip le  o f  
q u a n t it y  o f  p a r a l le l  c h a n n e l ,  b e c a u s e  th e  q u a n t it y  o f  s l o t s  in  e a c h  c h a n n e l  ( S )  
m u s t  b e  a n  in t e g e r  n u m b e r .
W h e n  t h e  s im u la t io n  is  c o m p l e t e ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  in f o r m a t i o n  c a n  b e  
o b t a in e d :
1 ) T o t a l  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  v o t e s  (S V ) .
2 )  T o t a l  o f  l o s t  v o t e s  ( L V ) .
3 )  Q u a n t i t y  o f  r u n s  w h e r e  a t le a s t  o n e  v o t e  is  l o s t  ( R )
4 )  Q u a n t i t y  o f  r u n s  ( V o t i n g s )  w i t h o u t  l o s t  v o t e s  ( R W L V )
5 )  Q u a n t i t y  o f  r u n s  ( V o t i n g s )  w i t h  l o s t  v o t e s  ( R L V )
6 )  B e s t  c a s e ,  th a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  h o w  m a n y  v o t e s  w e r e  l o s t  in  t h e  m o s t  
s u c c e s s f u l  r u n  ( B C ) .
7 )  W o r s t  c a s e ,  th a t  is  t o  s a y ,  h o w  m a n y  v o t e s  w e r e  l o s t  in  t h e  l e s s  
s u c c e s s f u l  r u n  ( W C ) .
F o r  a l l  r u n s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v a lu e s  f o r  th e  p a r a m e t e r s  w e r e  s e le c t e d :
T  =  4 8 0  s lo t s . N  =  1 2 0  v o t e r s . R  =  1 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
T h e  s u c c e s s i v e  s im u la t io n s  w e r e  e x e c u t e d  w i t h  Q  =  1 ..5 . Q t, u s in g  th e  
a p p r o p r ia t e  f o r m u la ,  g i v e s  2 , 7 7 2 5 8 8 7 2 2  c h a n n e ls .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i t  is  
e x p e c t e d  th a t  t h e  b e s t  v a lu e s  w i l l  b e  o b t a in e d  u s in g  Q p =  3 .
A. Verifying correctness of the formulas
M u lt ip l e  s im u la t io n s  w e r e  e x e c u t e d  t o  b e a r  o u t  t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  f o r m u la s  
( 5 )  y  ( 6 ) .  A s  i t  w a s  e x p l a i n e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  ( 5 )  in d i c a t e s  o p t i m u m  t h e o r e t i c a l  
v a lu e  f o r  Q t y  ( 6 )  t h e  n e x t  in t e g e r .  In  a l l  s im u la t io n s  th e  b e s t  r e s u l t s  w e r e  
o b t a in e d  d i v i d i n g  t  s l o t s  in  Q p p a r a l l e l  c h a n n e ls .  F o r  th e  p u r p o s e  o f  i l lu s t r a t in g  
t h e  s i t u a t io n ,  f i g u r e s  3 , 4  a r e  e x a m p l e s  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a in e d  w i t h  s e l e c t e d  
v a lu e s  o f  T  y  N .
H u n d r e d s  o f  s im u la t io n s  w e r e  e x e c u t e d  a n d  in  a l l  c a s e s  o p t i m u m  r e s u l t s  
o c c u r s  w h e n  Q p is  u s e d .
F ig u r e  3 s h o w s  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  l o s t  v o t e s  f o r  Q  =  1 . .5 .  T h e  l o w e r  l o s s  o c c u r s  
w h e n  Q = 3 .
F ig u r e  4 ,  s h o w s  q u a n t it y  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  v o t e s .  A l s o ,  in  t h is  c a s e  t h e  b e s t  
r e s u l t  o c c u r s  w h e n  Q = 3 .
B. Behavior of parallel channels technique.
A t  t h is  p o i n t  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  f a c t s  th a t  v a l id a t e  th e  m e t h o d .
1 ) W h e n  1 .0 0 0 .0 0 0  r u n s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d  w i t h  a  s in g l e  c h a n n e l ,  in  t h e  b e s t
c a s e ,  3 v o t e s  w e r e  l o s t  a n d  in  th e  w o r s t  c a s e ,  4 0 .  A l l  t h e  s im u la t io n s  w i t h  
Q = 1 . .5  g i v e  r e s u lt s .  H o w e v e r  b e s t  r e s u l t s  o c c u r  w i t h  Q =  3 w h e r e  in  t h e  w o r s t  
c a s e ,  2 4  v o t e s  a re  l o s t  b u t  in  t h e  b e s t  c a s e ,  n o  l o s t  v o t e s  a r e  r e g is t e r e d .
2 )  T a k in g  a s  a  r e f e r e n c e  th e  s im u la t io n s  w i t h  Q = 1 . .5  t h e  w o r s t  r e s u lt s  
a r e  o b t a in e d  w i t h  Q  =  1 in  a l l  t h e  m e a s u r e d  p a r a m e t e r s .
T a b le  I s h o w  t h e  r e s u l t s  o b t a in e d  f o r  r u n s  o f  th e  s im u la t o r  w i t h  
Q = 1 . . 5 ,  w i t h  7 = 4 8 0  s lo t s ,  N = 1 2 0  v o t e r s  a n d  R = 1 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0  r e p e t i t io n s .  





Percentage o f Lost Votes ( P L t/)
rrJ 0,1 cx.
0,08
i  :2 3 ¿
Q
1 5











F ig .  4 :  S im u la t io n  R e s u l t s :  S V
Q SV L V PL V B C W C
1 98291231 21508769 0,17924 2 40
2 107029947 12970053 0,108084 1 27
3 108763817 11236133 0,0936344 0 24
4 108001192 11998808 0,0999909 1 26
5 105794687 14205313 0,118378 1 30
T a b le  1: R e s u l t s  o f  S im u la t o r ’ s R u n s
5. CONCLUSIONS
It  is  c o n s i d e r e d  d e m o n s t r a t e d  th a t  th e  p r o p o s e d  t e c h n iq u e  in c r e a s e s  e f f i c i e n c y  
o f  s t o r in g  a n o n y m o u s  d a t a  r e s u l t in g  in  a n  a d v a n t a g e o u s  v a r ia n t  r e s p e c t  f r o m  
t h e  u s e  o f  a  s in g l e  a r r a y . T h is  f a c t  a l l o w s  s e t t in g  t h e  s e c u r i t y  l e v e l  f o r  th e  
d e s i r e d  v a lu e .  T h e  e m p i r i c a l  r e s u l t s  s u g g e s t  th a t  t h e  b e h a v i o r  is  h ig h e r  in  a ll  
a s p e c t s  s e le c t e d .
T h e  qu antity  o f  v o te s  that r e c o v e r e d  s u cc e s s fu lly  is  o p t im iz e d  d iv id in g  T  in  Q p 
slots. T h e  qu antity  o f  runs w ith o u t  lo s t  v o te s  is  h ig h e st  w h e n  Q p  is  u sed .
T h e  b e s t  c a s e  (B C )  o p t im iz e s  w ith  the u s e  o f  Q p. T h is  m e a n s  that th e  ru n  w ith  fe w e r  
lo s t  v o te s  o c c u r s  w h e n  Q p  is  u sed . S im ila rly  th is  o c c u r s  w ith  the v a r ia b le  W C  (W o r s t  
C a se ).
G ro u n d s  to  su g g e st  that the n e w  p r o p o s a l is  a s ig n if ica n t  im p r o v e m e n t  f o r  the 
sto ra g e  o f  v o te s  in  a s c h e m e  N o n  - In tera ctiv e  D in in g  c ry p tog ra p h ers . T h e  
p r o p o s e d  fo r m u la s  a lso  a l lo w  an ea sy  an d  a ccu ra te  ad m in istra tion  o f  the secu rity  le v e ls  
t o  th e  sy stem  u ser .
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